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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON		
3 4 5 6 7 8	VICKI VAN VALIN, on behalf of) herself and all others) similarly situated within the) state of Oregon; NEIL MERTZ,) on behalf of himself and all) others similarly situated) within the state of) Washington,) Plaintiffs,) No. CV-10-557-ST		
9	vs.)		
10	GOOGLE INC., a Delaware) corporation,) May 24, 2010		
11	Defendant.) Portland, Oregon		
13 14 15 16			
18	Preliminary Injunction Hearing		
19	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN		
21	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
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(PROCEEDINGS)

THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is the time and place set for a preliminary injunction hearing on Case

No. 10-557-ST, Van Valin, et al. v. Google Inc.

Counsel, can you introduce yourself for the record.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Rick Klingbeil for the plaintiffs and potential class.

MR. ALDISERT: Rob Aldisert, Your Honor, for defendant Google Inc.

And I'd like to introduce Dave Burman, my partner from Seattle, who had -- is in the midst of filling out his pro hac application, but we haven't quite got it in yet for this. And if -- with Your Honor's indulgence, he'll answer any questions. He's had a little bit more time to get up to speed on this than I have.

THE COURT: That will be fine.

MR. BURMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand from the parties you've attempted to work out an agreement on some sort of preservation of data and have been unable to do so; is that right?

MR. KLINGBEIL: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The question today appears to be not if but how much, so I'm aware from something I've received

from Google -- I believe it's their response -- that they are currently -- in fact, predating your complaint, have taken actions to preserve a certain set of data contained in hard drives.

What more than what Google is already doing are you seeking?

MR. KLINGBEIL: Your Honor, there are some problems with what they've done, which I will get into in just a minute.

THE COURT: Well, I should add that in terms of restraining orders, there are no problems with what they've already done, there never are with restraining orders, since I can't restrain what's already been done.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I need to know what you still want that they're not proposing to do.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Okay. What we still want is for this data in the form that it is now, which is an altered form already, to be taken and honed on to a drive similar to this one (indicating), \$40 enclosure, \$100 drive, holds a trillion bytes, which is more than enough to hold all this data here. And we want two copies of that lodged with the Court.

And here is why I want that. As the Court is probably aware -- but let me give a bit of background on

this -- copying data from one hard drive to another for evidentiary purposes is insufficient. As the Court probably knows, data gets written, data gets changed, data gets erased, and when we say stop, we want that data for evidence, there may be some data on there that's perfectly readable, and you can say, "Copy me the Jones file to my hard drive," I can do that. But if we're talking about the Jones case, there's information on that disk that may have been erased, for example, that's still there, it's just you don't see it when you pull it up on your computer, but it's still accessible. Those things can be very critical to a case like this. I can spill off five or ten reasons why that type of data may be critical to this case.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with that issue.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Okay. Very well.

Now, if you go to Mr. Stamos's declaration filed just this morning, large problem here, big problem, and I want to keep it from happening in the future.

THE COURT: I understand the big problem that jumps out at one when you read it, and that's what I meant by -- in terms of a restraining order.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes.

THE COURT: There may have been things lost. I can't solve that problem with a restraining order, and we're only here on a restraining order.

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So I appreciate that you are concerned that the way things stand right now, you may not have access to everything you would have had access to had the preservation been done differently. MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So what you want to do about that now is request Google to take what and transfer it on to your hard drive -- or to a hard drive left with the Court? MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor. Well, the data as it now exists, and described in paragraph 4 of Mr. Stamos, which is the files that -- the United States file that Google has collected and moved from one disk to another, in the present state they are on the drive they are, what I'm asking for is for them to take two drives like this (indicating) and make an exact clone of the drive that he still has in his possession and lodge them with the Court so that --THE COURT: He has a hard drive, I think it's called U.S. hard drive or something like that? MR. KLINGBEIL: U.S. hard drive, that has the United States data on it. THE COURT: And you want that hard drive simply cloned twice?

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On to two different new hard drives?

MR. KLINGBEIL:

MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And left with the Court?

MR. KLINGBEIL: Left with the Court so that in the future, if we need to access them, we can make motions and have orders from the Court.

THE COURT: And that's because your concern is that the -- what we're calling the U.S. hard drive may go through some other transfer or data loss?

MR. KLINGBEIL: I'm concerned about that. I'm also concerned about the part of his declaration where he says that his understanding of what he is supposed to do does not alter any of the payload data that's collected. Our initial communications on the 14th with Google, the day he was hired, was much broader than that: Don't alter any data you've collected from these vehicles from wireless, not just the payload data, any other positioning data and so forth.

So number one, his whole premise of what he's storing is incorrect, and that concerns me. To give an example, we may have payload data, but if we don't have the associated data giving us the identity of the wireless node and the MAC address for the machine or other positional data, we have no clue who he took it from. So it all goes together to formulate a position of where this was taken so we can identify the person it was taken from.

So he's operating under a false premise to begin 1 2 with, and, you know, we're very, very disturbed that these 3 four original hard drives were destroyed after he made some copies -- and I assume that's what the Court was referring to earlier -- but there was no reason to destroy the 5 6 original drives because now all that potential other data is 7 gone. 8 THE COURT: It wasn't -- just to be clear, there 9 wasn't no reason. There was a reason. 10 MR. KLINGBEIL: I'm sure there was a reason, yes. 11 THE COURT: Not one that you like, but --12 MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor. Okay. I agree 13 with the Court there. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I think I 14 15 understand what you want, and it's fairly clearly expressed, 16 so --17 MR. KLINGBEIL: One other thing, Your Honor. 18 just want to emphasize that we did on May 14, as my 19 declaration shows, send something to Google asking for 20 preservation. The things that happened in his paragraph 4 happened the next day, after we'd already given them notice, 21 just for the Court's clarification. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 23 24 MR. KLINGBEIL: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 MR. BURMAN: Your Honor, Dave Burman. Can you

hear me okay here or would you prefer --

THE COURT: No, you're fine there.

MR. BURMAN: Thank you very much for hearing me.

And obviously there's been a bit of a scramble on the Google side. Once Google management discovered that this mistake had been made, they took immediate action to try to reassure people that they were not going to use the data, and that was given the highest priority. Lawsuits were thought about a little bit later.

These are not original hard drives that were destroyed. The data was on Google's servers, and to make sure that they could reassure people that it would not be used in their businesses, their immediate step was to take it off of the servers and put it on four hard drives. So if we made a mistake in terms of the kind of metadata that Mr. Klingbeil was concerned about, it was made before it went to hard drives.

What Mr. Stamos has now made an exact copy of, but has encrypted and secured, is an exact copy of whatever was on the hard drives. Nothing was lost, in his opinion, when the copy was made. But they wanted to segregate the U.S. data from the data of the rest of the world because they were getting requests from the relevant authorities in other jurisdictions not just to take that data off of Google's network but to go ahead and destroy it.

The U.S. data has not been destroyed. There was no intention to destroy that, and that was the subject of the motion, was only payload data and only U.S. data. That crisis, that concern based upon statements made about foreign data in reaction to foreign jurisdictions is now gone. We have told them that we will preserve all of the U.S. payload data until we address the Court and Mr. Klingbeil further.

In terms of the other discovery information, we understand our discovery obligations. We did get his preservation letter on the 14th. That data is being preserved in place. Most of that data is in the regular business network of Google and it's going to remain there. We're not going to alter it or destroy it. We've got legal holds out to all of the people that we could think of that were relevant and took other steps to make sure that that data was preserved.

We see no purpose to creating additional copies of the U.S. data and lodging with the Court. I think Mr. --

THE COURT: The only purpose being argued is that apparently either just after or contemporaneous with a request to preserve data, you moved the data from the original hard drive, the data went from a server to a hard drive, you moved the data from that hard drive to another hard drive in the possession of some sort of consulting

company.

MR. BURMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: And that occurred apparently --

MR. BURMAN: Either on the 14th or the 15th.

THE COURT: Let me finish my question.

MR. BURMAN: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That occurred apparently the day after you received some sort of request regarding preservation in this case. Is that right?

MR. BURMAN: I don't know exactly when we received it or exactly when that change -- or that copy was made. I think our point is that it's the same exact copying that he wants. He wants another copy, identical copy made. And if there was no problem with making another copy now, there wouldn't have been any problem with making a copy then. They're both identical copies.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the shortest answer from your opponent's side is that remains to be seen. He wants a copy of what you have now. I don't believe it's his position that what you have now is an exact copy of what you had earlier.

MR. BURMAN: I agree with you. His position is it might not be a copy of what was on the servers. It is an exact copy of what was on the temporary storage for some number of days on that hard drive.

But --

THE COURT: What's the cost to you, if any, of the procedure suggested by plaintiffs here?

MR. BURMAN: There's two costs, I believe, Your Honor, or three really. One is in any normal litigation, there -- parties are trusted to preserve and maintain the data until the normal discovery process occurs, and we believe there's no reason to single Google out and treat it in a way that is different than what the civil rules require in terms of preservation of data, which is done by the parties, not always lodging it with the Court.

THE COURT: The only reason to mistrust Google in any way here is if Google destroyed something on May 15th, and it did destroy something on May 15th, more importantly resulting in a loss of data. And your contention is that it is categorically impossible that a loss of any data happened?

MR. BURMAN: I don't have the technological capability to second guess Mr. Stamos. Mr. Stamos says he made an exact copy but then encrypted it of the data that was provided to him.

THE COURT: Well, I guess it depends on an exact copy of what.

MR. BURMAN: Of what was on the hard drives that he then made a decision to destroy so that there were no

extra unencrypted hard drives that would be out there because of the concerns that various jurisdictions have, or other people in other states besides Washington and Oregon might have about access to this data.

THE COURT: So concern number one is that you -- that it represents a sort of an undeserved mistrust?

MR. BURMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: Number two?

MR. BURMAN: Number two is that there are -- this lawsuit deals with purportedly or presumptively Washington and Oregon residents. There is other data on this, and there may well be other lawsuits. In fact, one has been filed in California since this started.

Google's position is that it is in the -- it made the mistake, it is in the best position to respond to potentially conflicting demands and to address this Court at the time that it might need to as to this data, but that otherwise it should simply be held in the normal course and subject to discovery, if that becomes appropriate, and that Google has committed to the plaintiffs and now to the Court that it is going to preserve this data until the plaintiffs agree or the Court allows us to do something else.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Number three?

MR. BURMAN: Number three, the cost is de minimus.

We do agree with that, Your Honor. We're not raising the cost of making the additional copies in terms of the financial cost. There is some risk when you make additional copies of some other access being obtained to those copies. Because I presume that Mr. Klingbeil would want to either have them unencrypted or want to have the encryption key, our position is that we feel, now that this information has been discovered, we feel the best course is to have one copy of it, to have that secured and to make sure that the encryption key is kept separate from it.

THE COURT: The middle path, I suppose, is to expand, per plaintiffs' request, the preservation function of Mr. Stamos's company beyond payload data to something broader. Do you have any objection to that?

MR. BURMAN: Well, we certainly have no objection to satisfying our duties to preserve information under the federal rules. I don't believe it's appropriate to expand that at this point. That was not the request in the written TRO motion. There is nothing in there dealing with in some way having a third party preserve other data, and I technically don't know whether that might interfere with Google operations. The preservation request is so broad that it would -- our interpretation of it is that it requires us to make sure that a lot of e-mail is not destroyed or calendared out of the system, and to take that

off of the -- all of that off of the Google network without some sort of filtering to figure out what might be useful for ongoing business of the company would, I think, possibly create quite a hardship.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Klingbeil.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Your Honor, a couple things I think I need to correct here. Our request was very specific. It doesn't have anything to do with the e-mails and so forth. On page 2, I asked --

THE COURT: Page 2 of what?

MR. KLINGBEIL: Of my original motion and memorandum in support of the TRO and preliminary injunction. We speak to electronic data obtained from plaintiffs and class members that Google currently possesses. So we're talking about the things that came from the Google Street View, not e-mails and so forth. It's a finite known --

THE COURT: If I just went with your wording and you're trying to sell that as not being very broad, I don't know that you'd get there, because what you've just read to me is that you want Google to maintain the electronic data it obtained from plaintiffs and class members.

MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, through its Google Street View vehicles.

THE COURT: It doesn't say that, so that's what

you want, all electronic data it obtained through Google 1 Street View vehicles? 2 3 MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: From your plaintiffs? 4 5 MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. KLINGBEIL: A couple other quick things, if I 8 could. There is a California firm who is filing national 9 I have spoken with them this weekend and they are on class. 10 all fours with what we're asking for here as well. 11 THE COURT: Meaning what? 12 MR. KLINGBEIL: Meaning taking all the national data, putting it on a drive, lodging it with the Court, 13 14 where the Court has the encryption key and so forth. 15 Their fear and mine is this also: one drive, I can drop this drive on the ground right now. It will no 16 17 I probably can't access most of the data. I longer work. 18 can shuffle my feet on the carpet and touch the pins and 19 shock it, the data is gone. It's very vulnerable to have 20 this data, I don't care how secure his outfit is, on one drive, in terms of the drive can go bad. I have that happen 21 in my office all the time. It's just very, very -- what 22 shall I say? It scares me to have all this data on one 23 drive in one place. 24

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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We are, of course, here on a temporary restraining order. We're not here to resolve questions that may come up in a future time about whether anything nefarious happened with transfers or not. So I'm not intending to express any view of any impropriety whatsoever yet. That's not my position here today.

restraining order is to raise some legitimate concern -- I'm not going to use the precise term of art here, but some legitimate concern about the possible loss of data critical to the case. And I think, without having made everybody flesh out all of the history and cases, I think we're all familiar enough with this concept to be aware that virtually any transfer can fail to pick up data that a plaintiff later deems important. Whether that happened between the server and the first hard drive, we don't know, and that's not a problem I can solve by a restraining order.

Whether that happened between the first hard drive and the second hard drive seems far less likely, but again that's to be resolved at a later date.

My question here today is whether there's any serious risk that the current hard drive holding the U.S. data will in some manner fail to preserve all of the data plaintiffs believe critical to their case. And I believe plaintiff has made at least a showing of that possibility,

not through even a suggestion of anything untoward or illegal by Google, but it could be through hard drive failure, it could be through a misunderstanding between the parties about what should be preserved. Smart lawyers have, to my understanding, spent the better part of a weekend trying to come to an understanding about what should be preserved and have been unable to do so.

And so with what I consider to be a fairly low but existing showing of a possibility of irreparable harm, I look to cost to Google here, and I've tried to make clear here that the first cost, that this represents some sort of black eye as to Google's performance to date or historically is not a part of the consideration I'm making here today. Rather, I prefer to see it as a possibility that data won't be preserved that wasn't viewed as necessary for preservation by Google but later is viewed as necessary for preservation by plaintiffs.

I suppose in a very minor way there is this question of putting all the eggs in one basket, so to speak, preserving one hard drive, although that's solved by simpler means than plaintiff has suggested here.

But because the cost is so low, because there is some real concern that the parties will some day view the data as having been inadequately preserved through current means, I am going to require Google to make a clone twice on

new hard drives of the U.S. data for our current purposes, temporary restraining order purposes; that those hard drives will not go to plaintiffs, and in fact I expect down the road that we'll have to resolve when, if ever, plaintiffs use this method of obtaining discovery at the preliminary injunction stage, if not earlier.

But I am going to require Google to make those two cloned hard drives, with the appropriate access keys that have been described in the moving papers thus far, and that will obviate definitional problems about what the consulting firm needs to preserve, since we'll have that in the cloned hard drives.

I'm not expressing any view of what Google needs to do with its business relationship with Mr. Stamos. You have other reasons, I assume, for continuing to look to him for preservation, so I'm not -- this is not an attempt to make his work unnecessary in any way.

So I hope this solution ends up being fairly straightforward. I agree with Google that it raises concerns about whether this is the sort of default position any time a hard drive is involved. I don't intend for that to be the case. I am placing some reliance on the idea that shortly after preservation was requested, perhaps not as clearly as it could have been, but after preservation was requested, the hard drive on which the preserved data was at

that point stored was shortly thereafter destroyed. And that fact, I think, separates this case from the more run-of-the-mill case in which there is some other method of preservation not necessitating this cloning procedure.

I will ask you on behalf of plaintiffs to submit a precise form of temporary restraining order matching my rulings here today. I want to be clear I'm not restraining or ordering any particular further behavior or, for that matter, for my purposes any further preservation behavior, since we'll have the two cloned hard drives.

I know Google intends to continue to follow, independent of my ruling here today, its obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for preservation of electronic data, and whatever happens in California or other jurisdiction is of no moment to me here today.

So you can do that, I presume, by noon?

MR. KLINGBEIL: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BURMAN: Your Honor, could I make one suggestion?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. BURMAN: I'm not sure why two are necessary at this time. I assume we're entitled to keep the one that Mr. Stamos still has that will be cloned.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BURMAN: If one is sufficient, I think we

could simply agree to a stipulation that would lodge that one with the Court --

THE COURT: Why do you care about the difference between one and two?

MR. BURMAN: Two is fine, Your Honor. I just -we do have some concerns about there being too many copies
of this data extinct, but if two is the Court's preference,
I think we can just agree to a simple order that lodges
those two with the Court.

THE COURT: Let's do two for now, and I appreciate your concerns about access, and of course it's lodged with the Court, and I guarantee you it will collect dust here in court. No one will be accessing it here. And that may save us time down the road.

MR. BURMAN: Does the Court want the access key at the same time? That will be obviously -- it's a separate -- we don't want to write it on the hard drive, of course.

THE COURT: No. I think the access key can await the first opportunity for litigating the actual use of the cloned hard drive that will be left with the Court.

MR. BURMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: And just to be clear, although this will require further briefing down the road when this first comes up, my expectation is that we're going to look first to the hard drive of Mr. Stamos, and through a normal sort

of bilateral discovery process between plaintiffs and 2 Google, and then we'll determine at some future point 3 whether that appears to be inadequate in some way. So I know that it's easy to say that you don't 5 know what you don't know, but I am going to expect some sort 6 of showing to be made that what you get through a normal 7 bilateral discovery request and return relationship with 8 Google is somehow inadequate before we go to the extra step 9 of accessing the cloned hard drives left with the Court. 10 MR. KLINGBEIL: I understand, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: And that's in part so that if the 12 record in this case becomes clear that this was in fact unnecessary, then future courts will know that. 13 14 All right? 15 MR. BURMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all. Good day. 16 17 THE CLERK: This court is in recess. 18 (Proceedings concluded.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway 6/1/10 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter